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When we ask what is the final worth of this acute and careful investigation, we are hampered by the fact that the main point must perforce be left out of account, viz., the positive conception of historical science. We can only mention in passing the doubt whether there is any place left for history as science. The fundamental thought of the discussion seems to be this: natural science cannot give a copy, *Abbild*, of empirically real experience, therefore all that it does is unreal. This suggests the criticism that the argument involves a misconception of experience and our cognitive relation to it. The absolutely particular event, if such a conception be possible, is an object neither of interest nor of knowledge; only so far as it is recognized as related does it become such an object. Now it is this relative aspect of reality which science seizes and expresses in the form of law and principle. It is not the whole of reality. But even an image copying a detail of experience is not the reality, and can serve only as a more or less useful substitute for it. In giving this version of scientific research, it follows that the importance given by Dr. Rickert to the notion of simplification is disallowed. Simplification is, to put the distinction sharply, an incident rather than an end in scientific discovery. The true investigator welcomes unification as he welcomes differentiation. Dr. Rickert allows to the judgment validity (*Geltung*) in place of reality, but gives no further exposition of this concept. This is somewhat unfortunate, for the point is one of the most important in the discussion. Only one more subject can be touched on here. In the final perfect science, as we saw, room was to be left for ultimate elements, "last things." These last things are unchangeable, indivisible, and without different quality. The reason given is that, if they were not so constituted, science could never be perfect; if, for example, there were qualitative variation, then it would be forever impossible for science to be certain that its account was complete, and that no new variation could disturb its system. I cannot see that a science which sincerely accepts the experimental method can make such claims, or that any limit can possibly be set to the complexity and ultimate differences in things. Only from a metaphysical standpoint can such a claim be urged, and for the purposes of science such a claim has hardly more value than that of a suggestion.

W. G. SMITH.

Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy. By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898.—pp. viii, 357.

Histories of philosophy are numerous, but histories of particular philosophical themes are rather uncommon. And the reason is plain ; most philosophical themes are so interconnected, and so closely related to the fundamental problem of knowledge, that a man's position with regard to any one of them is generally an index to his views on all the rest. Consequently, it is hardly possible to treat any one of his doctrines apart from the system to which it belongs. Theories of the will, however, as Mr. Alexander remarks, are, to a great extent, independent of systems, so that we cannot infer a man's views with regard to determinism or indeterminism, for instance, from the general character of his philosophy. Theories of the will, therefore, admit of separate treatment, and they have been so various, and the problem they deal with is so important, that a historical account of them, such as Mr. Alexander here offers, cannot fail to be useful to all students of philosophy. He modestly disclaims, indeed, that his work can be called a history, because it does not exhaust the literature of the subject ; but most readers, I think, will find in it all the information they will need about the origin and development of philosophic thought on this important theme.

The author begins with a brief notice of certain ideas prevalent among Greeks of the prephilosophical period, and especially prominent in the dramatic poets ; namely, the idea of fate in relation to human action, and the idea of an opposition between reason and feeling. These ideas have perpetually reappeared in discussions about the will, and may be found to-day in slightly modified forms in almost every treatise on the subject. The notion of fate, indeed, has changed somewhat since the days of *Æschylus* and *Sophocles* ; for the Greek fate was a power which the human will could not resist if it would. Nevertheless, the Pauline doctrine of predestination, and the philosophical doctrine of materialistic necessity, have much in common with the earlier conception ; hence some notice of those earlier views forms a natural prelude to a study of the philosophical doctrines themselves. Real moral philosophy, however, began with *Socrates*, and Mr. Alexander, therefore, considers his own theme to begin with the doctrines of that thinker. Yet he finds some difficulty in ascertaining just what *Socrates* and his greatest disciple thought about the will, their investigations not having proceeded far enough to reach a definite theory. *Aristotle's* views, as presented in his psychology and his ethics, are much more elaborate and clear ; and Mr. Alexander has done well in giving a full account of them. On this subject, as on many others, that great thinker attained a depth and clearness of view which has

hardly been improved upon since, and what he wrote upon it is still worthy of careful consideration. Yet his position with regard to the freedom of the will is hard to determine, not because he considered the question and failed to reach a definite view, but because he does not seem to have considered it all. Mr. Alexander, however, thinks that his general theory of the will leads logically to determinism. With regard to the Stoics and Epicureans there is no difficulty on this point, the determinism of the former, and the indeterminism of the latter being well known; and, as their interests were mainly ethical, they gave special attention to the problem of the will. Mr. Alexander gives a concise account of their views, and also touches briefly upon those of the Academicians and the Skeptics. It is interesting to know that the Stoic Chrysippus first advanced what is now the main argument against the 'liberty of indifference,' namely, its inconsistency with the universality of causation.

Leaving the field of Greek philosophy, the author passes to the various theories of the will that have from time to time prevailed in Christian theology, devoting to them nearly one-fourth of his book. This seems to me excessive, for though the theologians, from St. Paul downwards, have had interminable discussions about the will, they have not advanced our knowledge of the subject, as far as I can see, a single step. They have treated the will solely in relation to the divine government of the world, about which they profess to be perfectly informed, and have neglected the study of the will itself; consequently their discussions have been unfruitful. I think, therefore, that they receive too much attention in this book, and I must say the same thing of the German philosophers since Kant, none of whom have added anything important on the subject of the will to what had been said before. Mere discussion without result is of no value in philosophy except to keep the philosophical tradition alive.

Coming down to modern times, Mr. Alexander deals with the British philosophers first, giving them only one chapter, however, while he gives two to the Continental thinkers. One of the first things that modern philosophers had to do, and one of the most important, was to emancipate themselves from the influence of the church, which was adverse to freedom of thought; yet the earlier ones, such as Descartes and Hobbes, endeavored to show that their views were consistent with those of the ecclesiastical authorities. Hobbes, according to this book, was the first to discuss the will in a purely philosophical spirit, not only presenting the arguments for determinism in an able way, but giving a somewhat elaborate theory of the will itself. Leav-

ing Hobbes, the author passes in review the theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, with only occasional glances at other British thinkers, and leaving all since Reid unmentioned, so that his treatment of this part of his subject is incomplete. Passing next to the Continent, he presents the views of Descartes and his successors down to Leibnitz, and those of Kant and other German thinkers as far as Lotze, closing his historical survey with the last-named writer. His reason for not treating the latest writers is that many of them have studied the will by the methods of science rather than by those of philosophy, and consequently their work requires to be dealt with separately. The evolution theory in particular has, in his opinion, almost revolutionized psychology, and he thinks it "not unreasonable to expect that the genesis of conscious volition may be explained, not only by the more rudimentary processes in the child, but also by the phenomena presented in the lower animals" (p. vii). For my part, I have no faith in evolutionism as a key to the problem of the will, or to any other problem in philosophy; but the attention lately given to the study of the will itself and its relations to other mental facts, on the one hand, and to bodily states, on the other, gives promise of good results.

Mr. Alexander tells us in his preface that this book is the first of a series dealing with the will problem, and that its object is to introduce a constructive theory of the will, on which he has been engaged for some years. He gives no intimation, however, of what his theory is, nor even of his position on the question of determinism or its opposite. Nor does he introduce any criticism in this book except in a few cases, and then chiefly for the purpose of showing more clearly the real character of the theory he is dealing with. The book is certainly a valuable addition to the philosopher's library, and its value is enhanced by the style in which it is written; a style not so strong as some, but clear and refined, and of uniform excellence throughout. Those who read the book will look with interest for the remaining volumes of the series.

JAMES B. PETERSON.

The Groundwork of Science. A Study of Epistemology. By ST. GEORGE MIVART. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons; London, Bliss, Sands & Co., 1898.—pp. xviii, 328.

During the last twenty-five years there has been a growing interest, among scientific men, in the problems of epistemology. This is especially noticeable in England and Germany. The present work comes